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I. Introduction
The long-run relationship between money growth (or anticipated 
inflation) and capital accumulation is a significant but controversial 
issue in macroeconomics. Tobin (1965) initially argues that the 
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relationship is positive. Inflation cuts down the rate of real return to 
money, thereby possibly inducing agents to switch from holding money 
to investing capital. However, in addition to this substitution effect, 
Stockman (1981) explains that the negative wealth effect of inflation 
must be considered. Inflation also increases the cost of holding money 
for future consumption and investment.1
Traditional studies on this issue provide well-known and diverse 
conclusions. In a standard money-in-the-utility-function model (e.g., 
Sidrauski 1967), money is superneutral in the long run because the 
two effects cancel each other. However, in a standard cash-in-advance 
model, which highlights the negative real balance effect, long-run 
inflation is associated with reduced aggregate capital stock. Athough 
previous studies based on these kinds of models have significantly 
contributed in analyzing the issue, there is skepticism regarding the 
reduced-form approach of these studies.2
Given the developments in a search-theoretic approach that 
emphasizes microfoundations for trading with frictions, attempts have 
been made to study the capital-theoretic issue through a new lens. 
Shi (1999) shows that a positive extensive effect of money growth can 
dominate its conventional negative intensive effects.3 Molico, and Zhang 
(2005) present numerical results wherein a distributional effect of lump-
sum transfers of money leads a positive long-run relationship between 
moderate inflation and capital accumulation. Lagos, and Wright (2005) 
develop a two-sector framework that integrates the competitive and 
search-theoretic markets to incorporate the frictions of microfounded 
theory into practical models for policy analysis. Aruoba, Waller, and 
Wright (2011) adopt this framework, revisit the issue, and show that 
1 Together with elastic labor supply, inflation also distorts the consumption-
leisure choice of households as discussed in Cooley, and Hansen (1989). 
Therefore, a reduction in the real money balance due to inflation adversely 
affects capital accumulation through another channel as long as labor and 
capital are technical complements in production. 
2 They introduce a special function of money as if money has it per se 
without explicitly modeling frictions that derive it as an outcome. Wallace (2001) 
discusses hidden inconsistencies in these reduced-form models, in which the 
real money balance is assumed to be productive.
3 A high cost of holding money by inflation makes households spend money 
rapidly. Increasing the number of buyers in the decentralized goods market 
increases the frequency of successful trades in it and facilitates investment.
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different pricing mechanisms in the search-theoretic market contribute 
significant quantitative differences in the effects of money growth.4
The current study analyzes a link that channels monetary policy to 
capital formation, focusing on demands for monetary liquidity in the 
production side of an economy. These demands are associated with 
the service of money to firms’ transactions for capital adjustment. 
Even though most macrostudies focus on liquidity demands for 
consumption, some researches focus on the production side. Money-
in-the-production-function models employ a reduced-form approach, 
and based on these models, various empirical studies following Sinai, 
and Stokes (1972) provide evidence for the positive relation between real 
money balance and aggregate production.5
Nevertheless, the frictions that link individual firms’ liquidity problem 
with the public supply of monetary liquidity is not explicitly modeled in 
mainstream macrostudies. By contrast, Holmström, and Tirole (1998) 
address a distinguished role for government-supplied liquidity on the 
production side. Kiyotaki, and Moore (2001) explicitly model frictions 
that motivate liquid assets to function in smooth investments. In their 
business cycle model, money is essential (as the most liquid asset) for 
the effective allocation of resources. However, this research focuses on 
the fluctuations by productivity and liquidity shocks and the role of 
monetary stabilization policy rather than the classical issue of long-run 
inflation.6
4 A survey of new monetarism is included in Williamson, and Wright (2010). 
Some researches in the literature analyze how money and capital compete as 
media of exchange. By contrast, others consider the situation in which capital 
cannot be used as a means of payment to focus on how the pricing mechanism 
in the search-theoretic market channels the effect of money growth to capital 
accumulation. There also exist many works that lay out new monetarist models 
of ideas in earlier monetarist or Keynesian traditions (e.g., Kim and Lee 2012).
5 Lotti, and Marcucci (2007) show that the demand for monetary liquidity by 
US non-financial firms is significant using a firm-level money-in-the-production-
function model. In a standard money-in-the-production-function model, inflation 
cuts down the real balances of money and usually has a negative effect on the 
aggregate capital stock in the long run. However, this prediction is critically 
affected by the specification of the manner in which money or its transaction 
service is incorporated into the production function.
6 In addition, assuming that all markets are competitive, their model is not 
explicit about the frictions that make a medium of exchange essential. Hence, 
the transition role of money is not explicitly determined in the model as in 
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In this paper, to determine the transaction role of money on the 
production side, a model is contructed in which agents want to trade 
capital due to idiosyncratic uncertainty in its factor productivity. 
Agents in the model economy must prepare physical capital before 
they observe the realization of its stochastic productivity in their own 
production. Hence, a market in which agents trade capital after the 
shocks are realized is essential for the economy. In addition, the Lagos-
Wright framework is employed assuming that this capital market is 
decentralized and has frictions that require monetary trade, and that all 
other markets are competitive. In this case, capital cannot be used as 
a means of payment in trading itself. Thus, capital in this environment 
cannot compete with money as a medium of exchange although it is 
storable.7
A key feature of the proposed model is speculative money holding, 
that is, agents hold money to use an additional investment opportunity 
that may arise later on. In addition, the installation of capital prepared 
by others for immediate use requires paying adjustment costs. As is 
commonly assumed, the unit cost of adjustment positively depends on 
the percentage rate of increase in capital stock. This situation implies 
that capital purchased by using money and capital installed before 
productivity shocks can be considered two factors of production for 
additional capital input. In case that the bargaining power of buyers in 
the capital market is sufficiently strong, the production for additional 
capital shows the diminishing rate of technical substitution between 
money and capital. Thus inflation leads to the portfolio substitution out 
of money to capital because it raises the cost of holding money.
However, the portfolio substitution out of money into capital increases 
the investment demand, and households reduce consumption and 
increase work to save additional capital. This situation demonstrates 
a price distorting effect of the inflation tax, which is distinct from the 
standard real money balance effect. However, if money and capital are 
strong substitutes in the production for additional capital input, and 
hence the direct effect of the portfolio substitution is sufficiently large, 
overlapping generations models.
7 One issue in monetary theory is to endogenously determine the objects that 
serve the essential role of medium of exchange. The model in the current study 
highlights the fact that a commodity cannot serve this role in trading itself even 
if it qualifies for the role in trading other commodities.
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then inflation increases the aggregate capital and output in equilibrium. 
This case is likely to occur when search frictions in the capital market 
are severe.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
model. Section III defines the equilibrium and characterizes it. Section 
IV investigates the effects of the anticipated inflation on the steady 
state. Section V presents the conclusion. The Appendix provides all 
proofs of the lemmas and propositions.
II. Model
A. Environment
Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, …, ∞. A continuum of infinitely lived 
households with total mass equal to 1 exists. Each household consists 
of a worker and an entrepreneur, and they share earnings and 
maximize the expected lifetime utility of the household.8 Four objects 
are traded in this economy: a perishable general good, physical capital, 
labor, and fiat money.
Workers are homogenous, and each worker has h̄ ∈ R++ ≡ (0, ∞) hours 
of time for each period. In each period, every worker derives utility u(c) 
+ l from consuming c ∈ R+ units of the general good and enjoying l ∈ R+ 
hours of leisure.9 The quantity of the net labor supplied by a worker 
is h̄ – 1, and l > h̄ means that the worker consumes l – h̄ hours of 
housework services supplied by other workers.10 Assume that u is twice 
continuously differentiable, u′ > 0, u″ < 0, u′(0) = ∞, and u′(∞) = 0. The 
discount factor across periods is β ∈ (0, 1).
8 Two members are assumed to exist in a household to introduce a competitive 
labor market in a simple manner. Alternatively one can assume that each 
household has a single agent who owns a profit-maximizing firm. The key point 
is that these firms must be independent decision units in the labor market, 
although they obtain investment funds from their owners.
9 The marginal utility of leisure is a constant, and its size is merely a matter 
of the measurement unit; hence, it can be normalized to one without loss of 
generality. See Wallace (2002) for insights into the role of quasi-linear utility in 
the Lagos–Wright framework.
10 The introduction of housework service or transferable leisure ensures 
the interiority of optimal choices at the individual level. This step avoids the 
complexity caused by a heterogeneous portfolio distribution due to diverse non-
labor incomes.
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Entrepreneurs neither consume nor supply labor. However, they 
can produce a general good using their capital and employing workers 
in the other households. The production function for a type i ∈ {L, H} 
entrepreneur is F(zi κ, h), where zi κ ∈ R+ is the capital stock in terms 
of effective units and h ∈ R+ is the labor employment. Assume that F 
is twice continuously differentiable and is the standard neoclassical 
production function. κ ∈ R+ represents the deterministic base of 
effective capital, and an entrepreneur’s type indexes an idiosyncratic 
shock zH > zL > 0 on its factor productivity in his or her current-
period production. Let z ≡ zH /zL, and normalize zL to 1. The shocks are 
randomly drawn at the beginning of each period, and their distributions 
are independent and identical over time. The probability that an 
entrepreneur draws type H is π ∈ (0, 1). 
Similar to standard models, capital available as input to production 
must be formed at least one period prior. Entrepreneurs freely 
transform one unit of the general good into one unit of physical 
capital, which serves their own production as one deterministic base 
unit of effective capital from the next period. However, by paying the 
adjustment costs, entrepreneurs can also use the capital made by 
others for their production. From q ∈ R+ units of the physical capital 
delivered from others, an entrepreneur who holds k ∈ R++ units of 
physical capital that he prepared obtains f (q, k) ≡ q – kΓ(q/k) units of 
the deterministic base, that is, κ = k + f (q, k). Γ is assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable, Γ > 0, Γ″ > 0, Γ(0) = 0, Γ′(0) = 0, and Γ′(∞) = 0. 
In addition, the installation function f is defined on R+
2 by letting f (q, 0) ≡ 
0 for all q ∈ R+. A capital stock in terms of effective units depreciates at 
a rate of δ ∈ [0, 1] in a period and can be converted back into the same 
quantity of the general good. 
To explicitly determine the entrepreneurs’ demand for liquidity, 
revenues from production are assumed to be unavailable for purchasing 
capital utilizable in the same period. This restriction is modeled by the 
sectoral structure of Lagos, and Wright (2005). Each period has two 
subperiods called day and night, and it begins at night. Production 
for the general good in each period starts at the beginning of the day, 
and capital should be delivered by the end of the preceding night to be 
utilized for the production (Figure 1).
Money is exogenously supplied and perfectly storable. Total money 
stock increases between day t – 1 and day t at a gross rate τt ∈ R++. Mt 
indicates total money stock at night t. Given the initial M0 ∈ R++, at the 
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beginning of each day t, (τt – 1)Mt units of new money are injected to 
each household in the form of lump-sum transfer, or taxes if τt < 1.
Every day, all the agents have an access to a Walrasian auction 
wherein they trade the general good, labor, and money. Thus, as 
in standard general equilibrium theory, daytime trades achieve a 
competitive allocation without using a medium of exchange.11 This 
means we can think of three competitive markets for each object, which 
clear simultaneously at a pair of relative prices. Pt and Wt denote the 
nominal price of the general good and nominal wage per hour in day t, 
respectively. 
At night, entrepreneurs trade capital and money after the realization 
of the productivity shocks. This market is decentralized with bilateral 
random matching. Each entrepreneur at night initially chooses whether 
he or she buys capital or sells it, and searches for his or her trading 
partner in the market. Under the standard constant returns to scale 
matching technology, if the seller-buyer ratio is n ∈ R̄  + ≡ [0, ∞], then 
a buyer is matched with a seller with probability α(n), and a seller is 
matched with a buyer with probability α(n)/n.12 Entrepreneurs are 
11 The daytime economy is the centralized sector in the Lagos–Wright 
framework. However, Williamson, and Wright (2010) clarify that the centraliz-
ation does not mean that everyone is simultaneously in the same place. Such 
situation threatens not only the essentiality of money in the framework but also 
the noncooperative foundation of any competitive market model. Anonymity 
can be considered a condition that must be satisfied in modeling a competitive 
market (see Osborne, and Rubinstein 1990).
12 The standard matching technology describes search frictions, which make 
some buyers and sellers simultaneously left unmatched. However, search 
frictions are unnecessary for the results in the present study. If assuming that 
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anonymous at night. Thus, trading in any match must be quid pro quo, 
and money must be used.13 Moreover, capital is exchanged only for fiat 
money under the assumption that any claim issued by the households 
can be costlessly counterfeited.14 Each party in a match observes the 
partner’s type and portfolio, and the terms of trade are given by the 
generalized Nash bargaining solution with a buyer’s bargaining power θ 
∈ (0, 1]. 
B. Value Functions and Decisions 
Hereafter the quantity of money in period t is expressed as a fraction 
of the total money stock at night t. Thus, the unit price of money 
indicates the real money balance. In addition, current leisure is used 
as the numeraire for daytime pricing, and thus prices are expressed in 
terms of utils. The price of the general good in day t is denoted by pt ≡ 
Pt/Wt and that of money by ϕt ≡ Mt/Wt. In terms of the general good, the 
real wage per hour and real money balance in the day are 1/pt and ϕt/
pt respectively. In equilibrium, pt ∈ R++ for all t. This study focuses on 
monetary equilibrium, in which ϕt ∈ R++ for all t.  
Gt ∈ Δ(R+2) represents the portfolio distribution at the time the capital 
productivity shocks at night t arrive, where Δ(R+
2) is the set of probability 
measures on the Borel subsets of R+
2. For any Borel set A ⊆ R+2, Gt(A) is 
the proportion of entrepreneurs who hold k units of capital and m units 
of money, such that (k, m) ∈ A at that time. Vt is the value function, 
such that Vt (k, m) indicates the expected lifetime utility of a household 
that enters period t with k units of physical capital and m units of 
13 See Kocherlakota (1998) and Williamson, and Wright (2010) with the 
references therein for discussions on the essentiality of money and the role 
of anonymity. For the essentiality, only a segment of buyers at night must be 
anonymous to their trading partners. Thus, credit trades of capital can be easily 
incorporated into the model by introducing exogenous heterogeneity among 
the trading matches. However, small gains are obtained from this extension 
theoretically because it leads to dichotomy between the money and credit 
sectors. Nosal, and Rocheteau (2011) note that the framework to introduce costs 
of using credits should be seriously considered for the extension.
14 A challenging question is what object emerges as money among storable 
assets. The current study does not aim to obtain an answer; recognizability is 
simply assumed to generate frictions by which only outside money serves as a 
medium of exchange. See Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2011) and Rocheteau 
(2011) with the references therein for discussions on the role of recognizability.
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money. In each period t, individual agents take Gt, pt, ϕt, Vt +1, and τt as 
given. They also take as given the rule that determines the terms of 
trade in the capital market.
Consider a household with K effective units of capital and m units 
of money at the end of night t; Wt(K, m) indicates its expected lifetime 
utility. Let ℏ: R++ ⟼ R++ be the labor demand function implied by pF2 
(1, ℏ(p)) = 1. For any real wage per hour 1/pt ∈ R++, each entrepreneur 
employs ℏ(pt) hours of labor per effective unit of capital, and each earns 
real profit rt ≡ F1(1/(ℏ(pt), 1)) + 1 – δ per effective unit of capital. Thus, 
 Wt (K, m) ≡ max {u(ct) + l + βVt +1 (k′, m′)}
                                                                   c, l, k′, m′
subject to the non-negativity constraints and
 pt c + l + pt k′ + τt  ϕt  m′ ≤ h̄ + pt rt K + ϕt (m + τt – 1).
The decision rules in any particular period are each defined as a 
function of individual states K and m. However, the budget constraint 
must bind; hence, l can be eliminated. Accordingly, the following 
equation is achieved:
 Wt (K, m) = pt rt K + ϕt m + ϕt (τt – 1) + h̄ + max {u(c) – pt c}                                                                        c 
                         + max {– pt k′ – τt ϕt m′ + βVt +1 (k′, m′)}.                             k′, m′
c: R++ ↦ R++ is the consumption demand function implied by u′ (c(p)) = p. 
In each period t, all households consume c(pt) units of the general good. 
In addition, each household chooses a portfolio (kt′, mt′) independently 
on its individual states. However, if an optimal choice is not unique, 
then households may choose different portfolios. For expositional 
brevity, this study assumes that in each period t, all households use the 
same behavioral strategy Gt ∈ Δ(R+2) for portfolio choice. The portfolio 
that is actually chosen by a household using a behavioral strategy is 
randomly drawn from the distribution specified by the strategy.
Consider a type i buyer with portfolio (kb, mb) and a type j seller with 
portfolio (ks, ms) in the capital market at night t. If they are matched 
and exchange q units of capital with d units of money, then the buyer 
and seller’s gains from the trade are as follows:
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 Wt (zi [kb + f (q, kb)], mb – d) – Wt (zi kb, mb) = pt rt [zi f (q, kb) – ψt d],
 Wt (zj [ks – q], ms + d) – Wt (zj ks, ms) = pt rt [ψt d – zj q],
where ψt ≡ rt
–1 ϕt/pt is the relative value of money compared with low 
productivity capital in day t. The total surplus pt rt [zi f(q, kb) – zj q] is 
positive only if i = H, j = L, and kb > 0. If this is the case, with ℓt ≡ ψt d, 
the terms of trade solve
 max [zf (q, kb) – ℓt]
θ [ℓt – q]
1– θ (1)
                                q, ℓt
subject to 0 ≤ q ≤ ks and 0 ≤ ℓt ≤ ψt mb. Let q, ℓ: R+
3 ⟼ R+ be the pair 
that constitutes the solution function: for any given (ψt mb, ks, kb) ∈ R+3, 
(q(ψt mb, ks, kb), ℓ (ψt mb, ks, kb)) solves the maximization problem. In the 
match, q(ψt mb, ks, kb) units of capital are exchanged for ψt
–1 ℓ (ψt mb, ks, 
kb) units of money. Define Β, S: R+
3 ⟼ R+ by
 B(x, k̃, k) ≡ zf(q(x, k̃, k), k) – ℓ (x, k̃, k), S(x, k, k̃) ≡ ℓ (x, k, k̃) – q(x, k, k̃).
The surplus for the buyer is pt rt B(ψt mb, ks, kb) and that for the seller is 
pt rt S(ψt mb, ks, kb).
In monetary equilibrium, the probability of obtaining surplus 
from spending money must be positive in each night. Each night, all 
type H entrepreneurs become capital buyers. In addition, all type L 
entrepreneurs become sellers each night under the assumption that 
any type L chooses to sell capital if indifferent. Hence, in any monetary 
equilibrium, the seller-buyer ratio in the capital market is nt = (1 – π)/
π for all t. Let ς ≡ πα((1 – π)/π) denote the total mass of matches in the 
capital market each night, and for any G ∈ Δ(R+2), define EG : R+2 × R++ ⟼ 
R+ by
 EG (m, k, ψ) ≡ ∫ [B(ψm, k̃, k) + S(ψm̃, k, k̃ )]G(d(k̃, m̃)) 
For an entrepreneur with k units of capital and m units of money at the 
beginning of night t, the expected surplus from trading capital at night 
is ςpt rt EGt (m, k, ψt). Thus,
 Vt (k, m) = ςpt rt EGt (m, k, ψt) + pt rt z̄k + ϕt m + ϕt (τt – 1) + h̄ + c(pt)
                  + max ∫ [– pt k′ – τt ϕt m′ + βVt +1 (k′, m′)]G(d(k′, m′)), (2)                        G
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where z̄ ≡ πz + 1 – π is the expected capital productivity shock.
III. Equilibrium
First charcterize the market clearing conditions for the daytime 
competitive markets. Given G ∈ Δ(R+2), let Gk, Gm be the marginal 
measures defined by Gk (A) ≡ G(A × R+), Gm (A) ≡ G(R+ × A) for all Borel 
sets A ⊆ R+. Gtk, Gtm represent the marginal distributions of capital and 
money holdings at the beginning of night t. The aggregate capital stock 
at that time is given by Kt ≡ ∫ k Gtk (dk). For any G ∈ Δ(R+2), define TG : R++ 
⟼ R+ by
 TG (ψ) ≡ ∫ ∫ [zf(q(ψm, k̃, k), k) – q (ψm, k̃, k)] Gk (dk̃ ) G(d(k, m)).
All trades at night t increase the aggregate capital stock by ςTGt (ψt) in 
effective units. Thus, the goods market clearing in day t requires
 c(pt ) + ∫ k′ Gtk (dk′) = [z̄Kt + ς TGt (ψt )][F (1, ℏ(pt)) + 1 – δ]. (3)
The money market clearing in day t requires ∫ m′ Gtm (dm′ ) = 1. Each day, 
if the goods and money markets clear, then the labor market clears by 
Walras’ law.
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of a sequence {Vt, Gt, Gt, pt, ϕt}∞t =0 
and a set of time-invariant functions {c, ℏ, q, ℓ }, where for every t, Vt is 
the value function, Gt is the behavioral strategy for portfolio choice, Gt 
is the distribution of capital and money holdings, pt, ϕt are the daytime 
prices, c, ℏ are the daytime decision rules, and (q, ℓ ) is the rule for the 
terms of capital trade. The equilibrium conditions are as follows:
(i) Given {Gt, pt, ϕt}
∞
t =0 and {c, ℏ, q, d}, {Vt, Gt }
∞
t =0 satisfies (2);
(ii) c, ℏ are the consumption and labor demand functions;
(iii) (q, ℓ ) is the solution function of the problem (1);
(iv) the daytime markets clear at pt, ϕt ∈ R++ for all t;
(v) Gt +1 = Gt for all t; and G0 with K0 ∈ R++ is given.
Begin to characterize the equilibria by deriving the rule for the terms 
of capital trade. Let F(∙) ≡ f (∙, 1) denote the percentage rate installation 
function. Then F(0) = 0. In addition, from F(η) = η – Γ(η)/η for all η ∈ R++, 
we obtain F′ > 0, F″ < 0, F′ (0) = 1, and F′(∞) = 0. Given that z > 1, there 
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exists η* ∈ R++ such that zF′(η*) = 1. Define μ̂, μ̆ : R+ ⟼ R+ by
 μ̂(η) ≡ z [θηF′ (η) + (1 – θ)F(η)] [θzF′(η) + 1 – θ]–1,
 μ̆(η) ≡ θη + (1 – θ)zF(η).
Then μ̆′ > 0, μ̂(0) = μ̆(0) = 0, and μ̂(η*) = μ̆(η*). After a simple calculus, μ̂′ > 
0 is obtained. Let μ* ≡ μ̂(η*) and η̂ ≡ μ̂–1 for notational brevity.
Lemma 1. If (q, ℓ ) is the solution function of the problem (1), for any kb 
∈ R++,
 η* kb μ* kb Case I
 η̂(x/kb)kb x Case II






 ks μ̆(ks /kb)kb Case III
 ks x Case IV
Case I x ≥ μ* kb ks ≥ η* kb 
Case II x < μ* kb ks ≥ η̂(x/kb)kb
Case III x ≥ μ̆(ks/kb)kb ks < η* kb 
Case IV otherwise 
and q (x, ks, 0) = ℓ (x, ks, 0) = 0 for all (x, ks) ∈ R+2. 
The socially optimal quantity of capital transfer is η* kb. However, 
at night t, the optimal quantity traded under bargaining requires 
real money balance rt μ* kb in terms of the general good. The quantity 
traded is constrained by the buyer’s liquidity and seller’s inventory. 
The liquidity constraint binds only in Case II, whereas the inventory 
constraint binds only in Case III. Both constraints bind in Case IV.
Thereafter, individual portfolio optimization is considered. For any t, 
Ut,t +1 : R+
2 ↦ R is defined by
 Ut,t +1 (k, m) ≡ –(γ
k
t,t +1 – βz̄ )k – (γ
m
t,t +1 – β) ψt +1 m + βςEGt +1 (m, k, ψt +1),
where γkt,t +1 ≡ pt/(rt +1 pt +1) and γ
m
t,t +1 ≡ (τt ϕt)/ϕt +1. In addition, let at ≡ ϕt (τt – 
1) + h̄ + c(pt) for all t. Through repeated substitution of (2), the following 
equation is obtained:
Vt (k, m) = ςpt rt EGt +1 (m, k, ψt) + pt rt z̄k + ϕt m + at
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    ∞
+ ∑ βt –s [ps +1 rs +1 max ∫ Us, s +1(k′, m′)G(d(k′, m′)) + βas +1].    s = t                                      G
The equation shows that characterizing Gt is sufficient to investigate the 
two-period problem
 max Ut,t +1 (k′, m′). (4)                                       k′, m′
Note that γmt,t +1 = Wt +1/Wt indicates the gross inflation rate from day t to 
day t + 1, measured by the nominal prices of leisure. In the absence of 
capital trade, the expected rates of return on capital and money in day t 
would be z̄/γkt,t +1 – 1 and 1/γ
m
t,t +1 – 1. Evidently, these rates cannot exceed 
the time discount rate 1/β – 1 in any equilibrium. At the inflation rate 
under the Friedman rule γmt,t +1 = β, holding money over night t + 1 is 
costless. This is the only case in which a monetary equilibrium exists 
without using money at night.
Lemma 2. If (k′, m′) is a solution to the problem (4) given γkt,t +1 ≥ βz̄ and 
γmt,t +1 ≥ β,
 ψt +1 m′ ≤ min {μ*, μ̂(k̃/k′)}k′,   ∀k̃ ∈ supp(Gt +1k ) (5)
holding as an equality only if η* k′ ≤ k̃ for all k̃ in the support, θ = 1, and 
γmt,t +1 = β.
The preceding lemma implies that all bilateral trades occur under the 
Case II in equilibrium each night.15 For notational brevity, q̂ : R+
2 ⟼ R+ is 
defined by q̂(x, k) ≡ η̂(x/k)k, ≡ 0 if k = 0, and g: R+
2 ⟼ R+ by g(x, k) ≡ f (q̂(x, 
k), k). Here g(0, k) = g(x, 0) = 0 is trivial. From g(x, k) ≡ F(η̂(x/k))k for all k 
∈ R++, g1, g2 > 0 is obtained. Unless Condition (5) holds as an equality, 
generality is not lost in letting
15 This situation implies that the Friedman rule is still optimal. The liquidity 
constraint in purchasing capital binds unless θ = 1 and γmt,t +1 = β; thus, relaxing 
the constraint yields an efficient allocation. See Figure 4 in the proof of the 
lemma. As a standard practice, a social optimum occurs when money holding 
has no cost due to inflation because it is costless to produce money.
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 EG (m, k, ψ) ≡ zg(ψm, k) – ψm + ∫ [ψm̃ – q̂(ψm̃, k̃)] G(d(k̃, m̃)).
In case that θ = 1 and γmt,t +1 = β for some t, we investigate the limit of 
equilibria as θ ⟶ 1 from below, or γmt,t +1 ⟶ β from above.16 The Kuhn–
Tucker necessary condition for a solution to Problem (4) is given by
 γkt,t +1 – βz̄  ≥ βςzg2 (ψt +1 m′, k′),       = if  k′ > 0,
 γmt,t +1 – β ≥ βς[zg1 (ψt +1 m′, k′) – 1],   = if  m′ > 0.
Given that g(x, ·) satisfies the Inada conditions for all x ∈ R++, k′ > 0 if k′ 
is optimal because γkt,t +1 > βz̄. However, g1 (0, k) = θ + (1 – θ)/z for all k ∈ 
R++; thus, the unit cost of obtaining money in a day must be bounded 




 γkt,t +1 > βz̄,   β ≤ γ
m
t,t +1 < βςθ (z – 1). (6)
The expected rates of return on capital and money without capital trade 
should not exceed the time discount rate. In addition, the unit cost of 
obtaining money in a day should not be too high to make it optimal to 
purchase no capital. Note that the existence of a solution in R+
2
+ does 
not guarantee γmt,t +1 ≥ β. The equilibrium conditions derived from the 
Euler equations guarantee only the other inequalities.
For further analysis, this study focuses on the case that F ∘ η̂ is 
strictly concave. This concavity can be motivated by assuming that 
buyers of capital have a sufficiently strong bargaining power, that is, 
θ ≈ 1, and it implies that g11 < 0, g22 < 0, and g12 > 0. The Kuhn-Tucker 
condition for Problem (4) now completely characterizes its solution. 
Condition (6) is necessary and sufficient for an optimum in R+
2
+. Unlike 
the situation in Lagos, and Wright (2005), the concavity does not imply 
degenerate portfolio distributions. Given that g shows constant returns 
to scale, as in the standard profit maximization, optimality only pins 
down the ratio between k′ and m′. However, an optimal ratio between 
the two is unique because of the concavity. Thus, the ratio must be 
16 Most reduced-form models do not have monetary equilibria under the 
Friedman rule. Thus, monetary studies commonly investigate the limit of 
equilibria as inflation approaches the Friedman rule instead. This study 
investigates equilibria under the Friedman rule as long as θ < 0.
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Kt +1 to 1 for the money market clearing in day t. Therefore, the Euler 
equations for portfolio optimization yields as follows:
 pt = βrt +1 pt +1 [ςzg2 (ψt +1, Kt +1) + z̄ ], (7)
 τt ϕt = βϕt +1 [ςzg1 (ψt +1, Kt +1) + 1 – ς]. (8)
In addition, the goods market clearing condition (3) yields as follows:
 c(pt) + Kt +1 = [z̄Kt + ςT(ψt, Kt)][F(1, ℏ(pt)) + 1 – δ], (9)
where T : R+
2 ⟼ R+ is defined by T (x, k) ≡ zg(x, k) – q̂ (x, k). The following 
lemma implies the law of motions for aggregate capital and daytime 
prices in an equilibrium can be described by a first-order difference 
equation system. Let st ≡ (Kt, pt, ϕt) for all t.
Lemma 3. A continuously differentiable function Φ: R+4+ ⟼ R+3+ exists, 
such that st +1 = Φ(st, τt) iff (st +1, st, τt) ∈ R+ × R+6+ satisfies (7), (8), and (9) 
simultaneously. 
Given G0 and {τt }
∞
t =0, an equilibrium is completely characterized by a 
bounded sequence {st }∞t =0 satisfying the first-order difference equation 
given by Φ and βϕt +1 ≤ τt ϕt for all t ∈ Z+ under the initial condition s0 ∈ 
R+
3
+. The portfolio distribution Gt for any t is arbitrary as long as it yields 
the aggregate capital Kt in the sequence. If {τt }
∞
t =0 follows a recursive 
process, the standard recursive equilibrium can be defined for the 
model.
IV. Steady-State Inflation
This section analyzes the effects of anticipated inflation on a unique 
steady-state equilibrium.
A steady-state given gross rate of money growth τ ≥ β is s ≡ (K, p, ϕ) ∈ 
R+
3
+ such that s = Φ(s, τ). Given st = s, τt = τ for all t, the gross inflation 
rate Pt +1/Pt, as well as γ
m
t,t +1, is constant at τ, and γ
k
t,t +1 is constant at r 
≡ F1 (1/ℏ(p), 1) + 1 – δ. For simplicity in analysis, c is redefined as a 
function of ℏ = ℏ(p), implied by u′ (c(ℏ)) F2 (1, ℏ) = 1. Moreover, μ ≡ (rp)
–1 ϕ/
K denotes the fraction of aggregate capital that is traded in the capital 
market. A steady state is completely characterized by (K, ℏ, μ) ∈ R+3+ 
simultaneously satisfying
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 1 = β[ςzg2 (μ, 1) + z̄] [F1 (1/ℏ, 1) + 1 – δ], (10)
 τ = β[ςzg1 (μ, 1) + 1 – ς], (11)
 c(ℏ) = [ζ(μ, ℏ) – 1]K, (12)
where ζ: R+
2 ⟼ R++ is defined by
 ζ(μ, ℏ) ≡ [z̄ + ςT(μ, 1)][F(1, ℏ) + 1 – δ]
to represent the output (including the scrap value) per physical unit of 
capital.
Proposition 1. Given τ ≥ β, a unique steady state exists iff τ < βςθ(z – 1). 
Condition (11) provides that an increase in the money growth rate or 
the inflation rate τ reduces the proportion of capital traded μ becuase g11 
< 0. Given the rule for the terms of capital trade, installation technology 
implies the diminishing rate of technical substitution between money 
and capital in production for additional capital input. Hence, an 
increase in the cost of holding money induces the portfolio substitution 
out of money into capital. This condition represents the Tobin effect.17 
Note that μ is not the real money balance. A reduction in μ does not 
imply the same size of a reduction in the quantity of capital traded as a 
reduction in the real money balance does in a reduced-form model.
Condition (10) provides that a reduction in μ increases the 
employment per effective unit of capital ℏ because g12 > 0, F11 < 0. In 
addition, consumption c decreases as ℏ increases. The substitution out 
of money into capital increases the investment demand, and households 
reduce consumption and increase work to save additional capital.18 The 
17 This effect and the other succeeding results do not depend on the 
assumption of constant returns to scale in the installation as long as the 
production for additional capital input exhibits diminishing marginal products 
of money and capital, and money and capital are technical complements in this 
production.
18 In a standard cash-in-advance model, such as that of Cooley, and 
Hansen (1989), consumption is a cash good, whereas leisure is a credit good. 
Inflation increases the cost of holding money. Thus, in such model, it reduces 
consumption and increases leisure (thereby decreasing labor supply). However, 
in the model of the current study, it induces households to switch investment 
from money holding to capital accumulation. Thus it reduces leisure and 
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increases in labor supply and demand for the general good indicate that 
the real wage per hour 1/p decreases and the real profit per effective 
unit of capital r increases. Note that the strength of this price distorting 
effect increases with the technical complementarity in production for 
additional capital input, that is, g12. A high complementarity or low 
substitutability implies increased distortion.
The change in the output per physical unit of capital ζ depends on 
the direct negative effect of the reduction in μ and the positive price 
distorting effect of this reduction. Around the steady state, 
 dζ                                                            dμ                                       dℏ      = η̂′(μ)[zF′ (η̂(μ)) – 1][F(1, ℏ) + 1 – δ]       + [z̄ + ςT(μ, 1)]F2(1, ℏ)      (13) dτ                                                             dτ                                        dτ
with dμ/dτ < 0 and dℏ/dτ = (dℏ/dμ)(dμ/dτ)>0, and dℏ/dμ, dμ/dτ can be 
easily obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to Conditions 
(10) and (11). If the price distorting effect is stronger than the direct 
one, then the output per capital increases. However, as will be shown 
below, such situation happens when ℏ increases mainly because of 
the reduction in effective capital rather than the increase in labor 
employment.
Given the change in ζ and the reduction in c, the change in the 
aggregate capital stock K is completely characterized by Condition (12). 
The change in output Y = ζ(μ, ℏ)K is equal to the sum of the changes in 
K and c. Around the steady state,
                                           dK             dℏ        dζ [ζ(μ, ℏ) – 1]       = c′ (ℏ)       – K      .                                           dτ               dτ         dτ
If the output per capital increases, then the aggregate capital and 
output are reduced because consumption decreases (see the left 
panel of Figure 2). The increase in the output per capital indicates low 
substitutability between money and capital in production for additional 
capital input. If money and capital are sufficiently substitutable 
in the production, and thus, the direct effect of the reduction in μ 
is sufficiently strong, then a rise in the inflation rate increases the 
aggregate capital and output (see the right panel of Figure 2). To be 
consumption because production and savings must increase to meet the 
increased demand for investment goods.
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concrete, suppose that g12 ≈ 0. Accordingly, the price distorting effect is 
negligible, that is, dℏ/dτ ≈ 0, and the consumption decreases slightly. 
Condition (12) implies that the aggregate capital increases nearly as 
much as to compensate the reduction in the output per capital by the 
direct effect of the reduction in μ. The output also increases nearly as 
much as the aggregate capital increases.
Although inflation may increase the output, it never improves the 
welfare of households. Households work too much and consume too 
small at any inflation rate other than the Friedman rule τ = β, and 
an increase in the rate enhances distortion. Unlike existing studies 
that only take negative wealth effect into account, the current study 
demonstrates the possibility that households work excessively under 
inflation.
Investigate how the degree of search frictions (or matching 
technology) in the capital market affects the effects of inflation. 
Condition (10) indicates that μ becomes more responsive to changes in τ 
as the trading probability ς decreases. If search frictions are large, then 
a heavy inflation tax burden is imposed on each trade in it, thereby 
strengthening the direct substitution effect. By contrast, Condition (11) 
implies that the price distorting effect is withered if search frictions 
are large. Both ℏ and c become less responsive to changes in μ as ς 
falls. Moreover, Condition (13) shows that ζ becomes less responsive to 
changes in ℏ as ς falls. Therefore, an increase in the inflation rate will 
likely increase the aggregate capital and output when search frictions 
Figure 2
the effects of inflation
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are large.
V. Conclusion
A model with a decentralized capital market is developed to analyze 
the effects of monetary policy on the production side. This model 
provides a search-theoretic account for the link between liquidity 
problems in firms’ production and the supply of monetary liquidity.
In installing additional capital for immediate use, money and capital 
function as if they are two factors of capital production. By increasing 
the cost of holding money, inflation exerts a direct positive effect on the 
portfolio substitution out of money into capital and a negative price 
distorting effect on the aggregate capital and output. If money and 
capital are strong substitutes in the installation, then the positive direct 
effect dominates the negative one. This case will likely occur when 
search frictions in the capital market are large. This study focuses 
on the market structure used in most of the recent literature on the 
microfoundations of money. However, the key messages of this research 
do not seem to change as long as the structure yields the diminishing 
rate of technical substitution between money and capital in the 
installation.
Future studies may focus on several aspects. First the proposed 
model can be calibrated with specific functional forms for quantitative 
findings, such as the numerical effects of monetary policy on capital 
formation, welfare, and other macro variables. Then, as usual in 
new monetarist studies, one can examine how different pricing 
mechanisms influence the effects of monetary policy. In numerical 
analysis, introducing aggregate productivity shocks and investigating 
the fluctuations around the steady state are not difficult. In aspect 
of theoretical development, the proposed model can be extended to 
incorporate investment banking. Then one can take more seriously 
the details of central banking with a loan market in which investment 
banks compete.
(Received 2 January 2017; Revised 2 February 2017; Accepted 2 
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1 
Take arbitrary kb ∈ R++, and fix it. Thereafter, consider the 
maximization problem
 max [zF(η) – μ]θ [μ – η]1–θ (14)                                   η, μ
subject to 0 ≤ η ≤ η0 ≡ ks/kb and 0 ≤ μ ≤ μ0 ≡ ψt mb/kb. A pair of q = ηkb 
and ℓt =μ/kb is a solution to (1) if, and only if, (η, μ) is a solution to (14). 
The first order condition (FOC) for (14) is as follows:
 μ – μ̂(η) = λη [zF(η) – μ]
θ [μ – η]1 – θ [θzF′(η) + 1 – θ],
 μ̆(η) – μ = λμ [zF(η) – μ]
θ [μ – η]1 – θ,         
where λη and λμ are the Lagrange multipliers on η ≤ η0 and μ ≤ μ0, 
respectively.
In addition to the properties of μ̂, μ̆ listed in the text, we have
 μ̆(η) – μ̂(η) = θ(1 – θ)[zF(η) – η][zF′(η) – 1] [θzF′ (η) + 1 – θ]–1;
thus, μ̆(η) ≥ μ̂(η) for every η ∈ (0, η*), with equality only when θ = 1. FOC 
implies that η ≥ η̂(μ) because λη ≥ 0, and that μ ≥ μ̆(η) because λμ ≥ 0. 
Hence, we have four cases in the lemma (see the left panel of Figure 
3), and the lemma directly follows from the complementary slackness 
conditions. For example, in Case II, we have μ = μ0 and η = η̂(μ0) from λμ 
> 0 and λη = 0 (see the right panel of Figure 3). 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We focus on an optimal choice of money m′ in day t, given a choice 




t,t +1, and Gt +1. For technical 
simplicity, we investigate a choice of x ≡ ψt +1 m′ instead. In addition, we 
assume that Gt +1k is discrete with the support k1 < k2 < ⋯ < kI, and let ηi 
≡ ki/k0 denote the ratio of ki to k0. 
First we consider the case that η1 ≥ η*, that is, μ* ≤ μ̂(ki/k0) for all i. 
Any x0 > μ* k0 is not optimal unless γ
m
t,t +1 = β. A reduction in x from x0 
by sufficiently small Δx raises the expected utility by (γmt,t +1 – β)Δx. In 
case that γmt,t +1 = β, any x0 > μ* k0 is indifferent from x = μ* k0. However a 
reduction in x from μ* k0 by small Δx raises the expected utility by
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 (γmt,t +1 – β)Δx + βς[1 – [1 – θ(1 – θ)zF″ (η*)[zF(η*) – η*]]
–1]Δx. 
The second term equals 0 if θ = 1; otherwise, it is strictly positive. Thus, 
if (x*, k0) is optimal, then x* ≤ μ* k0 with equality only if θ = 1, γ
m
t,t +1 = β (see 
the left panel of Figure 4).
Next we consider the case that all households choose the same 
amount of capital k1 ex post, that is, Gt +1k degenerates to k1, and η1 < η*. 
If a certain household chose x0 > μ̂(η1)k0, then a reduction in x from x0 
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k0; otherwise, (γ
m
t,t +1 – β)Δx + βςΔx. Hence, such x0 is not optimal (see the 
right panel of Figure 4). We define R: R+ ↦ R by 
 R (μ) ≡ –(γkt,t +1 – βz̄)[1 + ρt,t +1 μ] + βς [zF (η̂(μ)) – μ]
with ρt,t +1 ≡ (γ
m
t,t +1 – β) (γ
k
t,t +1 – βz̄)
–1. If a certain household chose x = μ̂(η1) k0, 
then a reduction in k′ from k0 by small Δk′ with the same percentage 
reduction in x, which maintains the ratio of x to k′ constant at μ̂(η1), 
would raise the expected utility by –R(μ̂(η1))Δk′. Thus, (μ̂(η1) k0, k0) can be 
optimal only if R(μ̂(η1)) > 0. However, an increase in k′ from k0 by small 
Δk′ with the same percentage increase in x would raise the expected 
utility by
 R(μ̂(η1))Δk′ + βς [zη1 F′ (η1) + 1]Δk′ > 0.
Thus, (μ̂(η1) k0, k0) cannot be optimal. If (x*, k*) is optimal, then x* < μ̂(η1) 
k*.
The remaining is to prove the lemma for the case I ≥ 2 with η1 < η*. We 
consider the case that I = 2. Let x* be an optimal choice of x when all 
the households choose the same amount of capital k2. Then x* < min {μ*, 
μ̂(1)} k2. In addition, the optimality of (x*, k2) implies R (μ*) = 0 with μ* ≡ 
x*/k2. Suppose that a household chooses (x0, k0) such that x0 ≥ μ̂(η1) k0, 
and that x0 is optimal given k0. In this case, a lack of capital of its own 
hinders a further increase in the expected utility from using money. 
Increasing k′ from k0 to k2 raises the expected utility in the choice of x. 
In addition, no loss from the increase in capital is incurred if the ratio 
of x to k′ is changed to μ*. Hence, if (x*, k*) is optimal, then x* < μ̂(η1) k*. 
The mathematical induction completes the proof. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Let st* denote (st +1, st, τt ) ∈ R+ × R+6+ satisfying Equations (7), (8), and (9) 
together.
The market clearing condition Equation (9) directly gives the law of 
motion for aggregate capital Φk : R+
3
+ ⟼ R+ such that Kt +1 = Φk (st ) for all 
st*. In addition, given any pt ∈ R++, no pt +1 < ∞ satisfies Equation (7) if 
Kt +1 = 0. Hence, the codomain of Φk can be restricted to R++.
Let pt ≡ (pt, ϕt) denote the price vector in day t, and focus on finding 
Φp : R+
4
+ ⟼ R+2+ such that pt +1 = Φp (pt, τt, Kt +1) for all st*. First, we define 
γk, γm : R+
2
+ ⟼ R++ by
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 γk (x, k) ≡ β [ςzg2 (x, k) + z̄ ],    γ
m (x, k) ≡ β [ςzg1 (x, k) + 1 – ς].
Equations (7) and (8) imply γkt,t +1 = γ
k (ψt +1, Kt +1) and γ
m
t,t +1 =γ
m (ψt +1, Kt +1); 
hence, by the definitions of γkt,t +1, γ
m
t,t +1 and ψt +1, we have
 γm (ψt +1, Kt +1 ) = ψt +1 γ
k (ψt +1, Kt +1) τt ϕt/pt,   ∀st*.




1 < 0. In addition, γ
k (0, k) = ∞, 
γk (∞, k) = βz̄, γm (0, k) = βςθ(z – 1), and γm (η* k, k) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ R+2+. Thus, 
given any (pt, τt, Kt +1) ∈ R+4+, there exists unique ψt +1 ∈ R++ satisfying the 
preceding equation; hence a unique ϕt +1 ∈ R++ exists. In addition, since 
rt +1 is strictly increasing in pt +1, there exists unique pt +1 ∈ R+2+ such that 
γkt,t +1 = γ
k (ψt +1, Kt +1). Therefore, Φ
p is well defined, and the law of motion 
for price vector Φp : R+
4
+ ⟼ R+2+ is given by Φp (st, τt ) ≡ Φp (pt, τt, Φk (st )).
The laws of motion Φp and Φk constitute Φ in the lemma. The con-
tinuous differentiability derives from the implicit function theorem. 
D. Proof of Proposition 1
Evidently, given τ ≥ β, a unique μ ∈ R++ satisfying Equation (11) 
exists if τ < βςθ(z – 1). If μ ∈ R++ exists, then a unique ℏ ∈ R++ satisfying 
Equation (10) exists.
The proof is completed by showing that ζ(μ, ℏ) > 1. Given that g shows 
constant returns to scale,
 T (μ, 1) = zg(μ, 1) – η̂(μ) = zg2 (μ, 1) + μ[zg1 (μ, 1) – 1] + μ – η̂(μ).
 
From Equation (11), we have zg1 (μ, 1) > 1. In addition, μ ≥ η̂(μ) because 
(η̂(μ), μ) is a solution to Problem (14). Thus, T(μ, 1) > zg2 (μ, 1). Given that 
F shows constant returns to scale, F (1, ℏ) > F1 (1/ℏ, 1), and ζ(μ, ℏ) is 
larger than the right hand side of Equation (10). 
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